There is a need to introduce a statistical method to the toolkit of the regulators that is versatile, easy-to-use and can handle complex cause-effect phenomena that are not directly observable or measurable, i.e. latent constructs. In a first application of partial least squares structural...

Global financial institutions play an important role in channeling funds across countries and, therefore, transmitting monetary policy from one country to another. In this paper, we study whether such international transmission depends on financial institutions' business models. In particular,...

In this work, behavior of money multipliers for a developing country, Turkey is examined and is calculated by estimating the values of the model constructed for the purpose for the period of 1952-1972. However, model lends itself for applications covering any other period.Study includes three...

We explore the consequences from the two regulatory frameworks Dodd-Frank and EMIR for industrial corporates. We point out that - by falling under the clearing obligation - not only the corporate's option to decide freely on its positioning within the well-known “Risk Triangle” is...

Why do large European banks lobby for monetary union? We show in a game-theoretic model that monetary union can trigger a change in the structure of the market for international banking transactions with asymmetric effects on profits: large banks are induced to cooperate internationally and gain...

We build a model of financial sector illiquidity in an open economy. Illiquidity is defined as a situation in which a country's consolidated financial system has potential short-term obligations that exceed the amount of foreign currency available on short notice. We show that illiquidity is key...

Traditionally, aggregate liquidity shocks are modelled as exogenous events. Extending our previous work (Cao & Illing, 2008), this paper analyses the adequate policy response to endogenous systemic liquidity risk. We analyse the feedback between lender of last resort policy and incentives of...

Traditionally, aggregate liquidity shocks are modelled as exogenous events. Extending our previous work (Cao & Illing, 2007), this paper analyses the adequate policy response to endogenous systemic liquidity risk. We analyse the feedback between lender of last resort policy and incentives of...

During the financial crisis of 2007-10, the Federal Reserve (Fed) served as a global lender of last resort by establishing currency swap agreements with 14 central banks, including several in East Asia, to provide dollar liquidity to banks in foreign jurisdictions. These agreements were...