We characterize optimal corporate boards when shareholders face a trade-off between improving information sharing between the board and management and reducing distortions in decision making arising out of managerial agency. We show that allocating authority to management is suboptimal....

We look for necessary properties of shareholder-value maximizing corporate boards when shareholders face a trade-off between improving information sharing between the board and management and reducing distortions in decision-making arising out of managerial agency. We draw a distinction between...

We study how interest alignment between CEOs and corporate boards affects investment efficiency. The model entails a CEO who encounters an investment project and decides either or not to present it for approval to a board of directors. The CEO may need to collect and report investment-relevant...

We develop a tractable model of limited cognitive perception of the optimal policy function, with agents using costly reasoning effort to update beliefs about this optimal mapping of economic states into actions. A key result is that agents reason less (more) when observing usual (unusual)...

This paper applies standard maximum likelihood (ML) techniques to find an optimal agent-based model (ABM), where optimal could refer to replicating a pattern or matching observed data. Because ML techniques produce a covariance matrix for the parameter estimates, the method here provides a means...