This paper studies how pay transparency affects organizations that reward employees based on their efforts (i.e., using "subjective performance evaluation"). First, we show that transparency triggers social comparisons that require the organization to pay its employees an "envy premium". This...

This paper studies how pay transparency affects organizations that reward employees based on their efforts (i.e., using "subjective performance evaluation"). First, we show that transparency triggers social comparisons that require the organization to pay its employees an "envy premium". This...

A previous literature cautions that paying workers for performance might crowd out non-monetary motives to work hard. Empirical evidence from the field, however, has been based on between-subjects designs that are best suited for detecting crowding out due to low-powered incentives. High-powered...

This paper analyzes data from a tournament, namely the National Hockey League regular scheduled season of games, which provides incentives to increase effort in order to reach the playoffs and incentives to decrease effort once a team has been eliminated from playoff considerations because of...

Principal-agent relationships are typically motivated by efficiency gains from comparative advantage. However, such delegation may also arise because it allows principals the pursuit of selfish outcomes while avoiding explicitly selfish behavior. We report laboratory experiments in which...

I examine incentive contracting with an agent who disagrees with the principal and creates organizational frictions when the actual performance evaluation and compensation fall short of what he thinks he should earn. Results show that seemingly rigid policies, such as long-term performance...

To which extent does an increase in operating effectiveness of public employment agencies on the one hand and a reduction of unemployment benefits on the other reduce unemployment? Using the recent labour market reform in Germany as background we find that the role of unemployment benefit...

We develop a model wherein a risk-neutral but ambiguity-averse principal contracts with a risk-averse agent who has a risky project. Both the agent and the principal can observe the project output and a public signal. The correlation between the output and the public signal is private...

Several European countries have reformed their labor market institutions. Incentive effects of unemployment benefits have been an important aspect of these reforms. We analyze this issue in a principal-agent model, focusing on unemployment levels and labor productivity. In our model, a higher...