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Don't Tell Us : The Demand for Secretive Behaviour

Salmon, Pierre - 2009

The matter studied here is how, and with what implications, people may decide that they do not want to be let into secrets that concern them. They could get the information at no cost but they refuse to know. The reasoning is framed in terms of principals and agents, with the principals assumed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014206131

Origin of the Theory of Agency : An Account By One of the Theory's Originators

Mitnick, Barry M. - 2019

The first scholars to propose, explicitly, that a theory of agency be created, and to actually begin its creation, were … theory of agency, and Mitnick for the institutional theory of agency, though the basic concepts underlying these approaches … origin and early years of the theory, placing its development in the context of other research in this area …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014223582

From Private to Public Common Agency

Billette de Villemeur, Etienne; Versaevel, Bruno P. A. - 2012

This note establishes that two propositions in the theory of private common agency by Laussel and Le Breton (J. Econ …. Theory 100 (2001) 93) extend to a larger class of games, in which each principal's gross monetary payoff does not depend …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014060325

Citizens, Autocrats, and Plotters : An Agency Theory of Coups D'Etat

Sanhueza, Ricardo; Galetovic, Alexander - 1998

We present an agency model of coup attempts in autocracies. The autocrat's objectives conflict with those of the citizenry. Under the assumption that the autocrat's policy choices cannot be observed by the citizenry, but are correlated with the short-run performance of the economy we find that:...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014068997

Interregional Negotiations and Strategic Delegation Under Government Subsidy Schemes

Shinohara, Ryusuke - 2019

We examine whether the strategic delegation problem in interregional negotiations can be solved by a governmental policy. It is well known that when an interregional negotiation is delegated to representatives, each region elects its representative strategically, resulting in inefficient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014118730

Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power : Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice between Agencies and Courts

Stephenson, Matthew - 2005

This paper contributes to the positive political theory of legislative delegation by modeling formally the decision …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014065112

Garcia, Kristelia - 2019

Regulatory arbitrage — defined as the manipulation of regulatory treatment for the purpose of reducing regulatory costs or increasing statutory earnings — is often seen in heavily-regulated industries. An increase in the regulatory nature of copyright, coupled with rapid technological...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012899681

Modularity and optimality in social choice

Amendola, Gennaro; Settepanella, Simona - 2010

authority has the power of determining the social outcome. In this paper we will tie the model above to tournament theory …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008729132

Social choice among complex objects

Marengo, Luigi; Settepanella, Simona - 2010

We present a geometric model of social choice when the latter takes place among bundles of interdependent elements, that we will call objects. We show that the outcome of the social choice process is highly dependent on the way these bundles are formed. By bundling and unbundling the same set of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008729160

Decidability and manipulability in social choice

Amendola, Gennaro; Marengo, Luigi; Settepanella, Simona - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009558504