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the literature in industrial economics neglects individuals' incentives to form cartels. Although oligopoly experiments …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012938866
the literature in industrial economics neglects individuals’ incentives to form cartels. Although oligopoly experiments …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013296722
Algorithmic competition has arrived. With it has come the specter of algorithmic collusion – rapid detection of co-conspirators’ defection via technologically enhanced price monitoring and setting capability can encourage anticompetitive collusion. Strikingly, the ability to track...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014093500
The literature on cartel stability sidelines antitrust policy, whereas the literature on antitrust policy tends to … neglect issues of cartel stability. This paper attempts to connect these two interrelated aspects in the context of an … augmented quantity leadership model. The cartel is the Stackelberg quantity leader and the fringe firms are in Cournot …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012012419
cartel, a group of competing fringe firms, and a welfare maximizing antitrust authority. In existing models of cartel … behavior, at least one of these actors is always missing. By contrast, the present paper's oligopoly model includes all three … actors. The cartel is the Stackelberg quantity leader and the fringe firms are in Cournot competition with respect to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012425162
Courts and commentators are sharply divided about how to assess “reverse payment” patent settlements under antitrust law. The essential problem is that a PTO-issued patent provides only a probabilistic indication that courts would hold that the patent is actually valid and infringed, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014167001
Since the introduction of a formal commitments procedure in EU antitrust policy (Article 9 of Council Regulation 1/2003), the European Commission has extensively settled cases of alleged anticompetitive practices. In this paper, we use a formal model of law enforcement (Bebchuk, 1984; Shavell, 1988)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012856496
cartelized industry. This paper endogenizes the process of cartel formation in a numeric simulation model where firms differ in … marginal costs and production technologies. The paper models the incentive to collude in a differentiated products Bertrand-oligopoly … empirical methods used in the detection of cartels. -- Collusion ; Cartel Detection ; Cartel Formation ; Differential Evolution …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003950512
We investigate the effect of a vertical merger on downstream firms' ability to collude in a repeated game framework. We show that a vertical merger has two main effects. On the one hand, it increases the total collusive profits, increasing the stakes of collusion. On the other hand, it creates...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011482885
Partial cross ownership (PCO) among firms affects their incentives to engage in tacit collusion. We analyze collusion behavior in an n-firm industry which allows asymmetric cross ownership, under Cournot competition. We find that in some ways increasing PCO hinders tacit collusion under the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012896254