We report results from experiments designed to investigate the prevalence of turn-taking in three-person finitely repeated threshold public good games without communication. Individuals can each make a discrete contribution. If the number of contributors is at least equal to the threshold, a...

Although it is widely recognized that sanction increases cooperation in a public good game, comparatively little attention has been paid to a scenario in which agents have heterogeneous productivity (i.e. asymmetric impact on the group account). This paper examines the extent to which sanction...

This paper studies experimentally how the endogeneity of sanctioning institutions affects the severity of punishment in social dilemmas. We allow individuals to vote on the introduction of third-party-administered sanctions, and compare situations in which the adoption of this institution is...

We analyze experimentally behavior in a finitely repeated public goods game. One of the main results of the literature is that contributions are initially high, and gradually decrease over time. Two explanations of this pattern have been developed: (i) the population is composed of free-riders,...

Understanding whether the size of the interacting group has an effect on cooperative behavior has been a major topic of debate since the seminal works on cooperation in the 1960s. Half a century later, scholars have yet to reach a consensus, with some arguing that cooperation is harder in larger...

This study explores asymmetric volunteers' dilemma (VOD) games where costs for volunteering is different among players. Diekmann (1993) conjectures that an equilibrium, in which a player with less costs contributes, is more likely to be played if it is risk dominant. We re-examined this...

We investigate the impact of various audit schemes on the provision of public goods, when contributing less than the average of the other group members is centrally sanctioned and the probability of an audit is unknown. We study how individuals update their beliefs about the probability of being...