We identify persistent director style effects on corporate policies. Director style explains a significant amount of cross-sectional variation in firm policy variables for financing, investment, operations, and corporate governance, among others. The results are significantly different from...

Recent corporate governance scandals have been attributed to lack of board independence and the influence CEOs have over their boards. However, CEOs can also affect board efficacy without compromising independence by choosing directors strategically. We offer a theoretical framework using a...

We show that board tenure exhibits an inverted U-shaped relation with firm value and accounting performance. The quality of corporate decisions, such as M&A, financial reporting quality, and CEO compensation, also has a quadratic relation with board tenure. Our results are consistent with the...

The current study investigates whether board age diversity affects company financial performance and risk, and whether diverse work-related values held by directors of different ages are the underlying cause of any effects via a sample of listed companies from Turkey, which has a collectivistic...

We ask when and how a diverse board can benefit shareholders. Board diversity may be value-increasing even if some directors have agendas that are not perfectly aligned with shareholders' interests. Diversity commits the board to a high information standard because directors with opposing...

Boards of directors have been subject to unprecedented pressure to change and professionalize in the last decades. We analyze board structures of blue-chip firms in Switzerland between 1988 and 2017. The study shows that exogenous sources, not particularly induced by hard law, have had an...

Boards of directors play their role in corporate governance by advising and/or monitoring managers. In the corporate disclosure literature, prior research has documented directors' monitoring role, yet empirical evidence on directors' advising role is limited. Since the advising role often...

Prior research suggests that the effectiveness of corporate directors depends on their qualifications. We investigate whether directors' qualifications affect the roles they perform on the board (board functions) and their compensation. On average, directors that are more qualified handle more...

Prior SEC inquiries concerning self-dealing in securities lending programs suggest potential conflicts of interest when funds employ lending agents that are affiliated with their sponsor. We posit that the level of self-dealing is potentially greater, and mutual funds' securities lending returns...

We use exogenous changes in the probability that firms adopt executive ownership guidelines (EOGs) to measure the influence of board connections on the spreading of executive compensation policy. EOGs require managers to hold pre-specified equity ownership levels, and their use has increased...