There is a debate on whether executive pay reflects rent extraction due to managerial power or is the result of arms-length bargaining in a principal-agent framework. In this paper we offer a test of the managerial power hypothesis by empirically examining the CEO compensation of U.S. public...

There is a debate on whether executive pay reflects rent extraction due to “managerialpower” or is the result of arms-length bargaining in a principal-agent framework. In this paperwe offer a test of the managerial power hypothesis by empirically examining the CEOcompensation of U.S. public...

There is a debate on whether executive pay reflects rent extraction due to "managerial power" or is the result of arms-length bargaining in a principal-agent framework. In this paper we offer a test of the managerial power hypothesis by empirically examining the CEO compensation of U.S. public...

This paper exploits information contained in cross-sectional PEG ratios to extract estimates of the market's expectations for aggregate returns and economic fundamentals. By combining the loglinear present-valuation model and the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) logic, we establish a theoretic...

Stock prices are more informative when the information has less social value. Speculators with limited resources making costly (private) information production decisions must decide to produce information about some firms and not others. We show that producing and trading on private information...