Using a large sample of U.S. public firms, we find robust evidence that short interest is positively related to one-year ahead stock price crash risk. The evidence is consistent with the view that short sellers are able to ferret out bad news hoarding by managers. Additional findings show that...

We examine the implication of executive gender on asset prices. Using a large sample of US public firms during 2006--2015, we find a negative association between female CFOs and future stock price crash risk. However, the impact of female CEOs on crash risk is not statistically significant. The...

We investigate whether generalist chief executive officers (CEOs) who gain transferable skills across firms and industries have less incentive to hoard bad news. To address endogeneity concerns stemming from firm-CEO matching, we deploy a difference-in-differences method utilizing exogenous CEO...

Using a large sample of U.S. public firms, we find robust evidence that short interest is positively related to one-year ahead stock price crash risk. The evidence is consistent with the view that short sellers are able to detect bad news hoarding by managers. Additional findings show that the...

We examine whether executive compensation contracts affect conservative accounting. Managers, on the one hand, may increase conservative accounting as a defensive strategy to avoid ex post penalties from clawbacks upon financial misstatement (manager incentive perspective). Stakeholders, on the...

This paper examines the effects of promotion-based tournament incentives for non-CEO executives on corporate innovation. We find that firms with greater tournament incentives, which are measured as the pay gap between the CEO and other executives, are associated with a higher level of patent...

We show in a theoretical model that credit default swaps induce managerial agency problems through two channels: reducing the opportunity for managers to transfer value to equityholders from creditors via strategic default, and reducing the intensity of monitoring by creditors, which leads to...

This study investigates the relation between the use of explicit employment agreements (EA) and CEO compensation. Overall, our findings are broadly consistent with the predictions of Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978) that an EA is used to induce CEOs to make firm-specific human capital...

In this article, we analyze whether the manipulation of stock options still continues to this day. Our evidence shows that executives continue to employ a variety of manipulative devices to increase their compensation, including backdating, bullet-dodging, and spring- loading. Overall, we find...

We investigate if CEO power influences a firm's decision to change its compensation system in response to regulatory and public pressure. In particular, we assess if CEO power influences the choice of performance measures as a form of camouflage to minimize the impact of these reforms on their...