This paper examines the link between bank competition measures and risk indicators using quarterly interbank exposures data for all banks in Mexico during 2008Q1-2019Q1. The classical literature focuses on disentangling the link between competition and individual bank solvency risk. In this...

This paper deals with trade platforms whose operators not only allow third party sellers to offer their products to consumers, but also offer products themselves. In this context, the platform operator faces a hold-up problem if he uses classical twopart tariffs only as potential competition...

Is the reputation of a firm tradable when the change in ownership is observable? We consider a competitive market in which a share of owners must retire in each period. New owners bid for the firms that are for sale. Customers learn the owner’s type, which reflects the quality of the good...

Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer or the seller? Our answer — the seller — follows from a non–trivial analysis revealing a clear intuition. Buyer–induced certification acts as an...

In this paper, we present agent-based simulations that model the interactions between software buyers and vendors in a software market that offers Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) and perpetual software (PS) licensing under different pricing schemes. In particular, scenarios are simulated, in which...

We study the effects of reputation and competition in a stylized market for experience goods. If interaction is anonymous, such markets perform poorly: sellers are not trustworthy, and buyers do not trust sellers. If sellers are identifiable and can, hence, build a reputation, efficiency...

The purpose of this paper is to provide an explanation for relative pricing of futures contracts with respect to underlying stocks using a model incorporating short sales constraints and informational lags between the two markets. In this model stocks and futures are perfect substitutes, except...

We study the effects of reputation and competition in a stylized market for experience goods. If interaction is anonymous, such markets perform poorly: sellers are not trustworthy, and buyers do not trust sellers. If sellers are identifiable and can, hence, build a reputation, efficiency...

The object of this paper is to discuss on-line intermediation from the perspective of two-sided markets. It builds a simple model of the intermediation activity when trading partners are involved in a commercial relationship and uses it to illustrate some of the results that emerge in the...

This paper is the first of two companion pieces examining competition between payment systems. Here we develop a model of competing platforms which generalises that considered by Chakravorti and Roson (2006). In particular, our model allows for fully endogenous multi-homing on both the merchant...