It is well known that there are infinitely many incentive contracts that achieve the full information outcome in the standard agency model when the agent is risk-neutral. However, since Harris and Raviv (1979), the fixed-rent contract has been the focal point among those infinitely many...

This paper investigates staged financing in an environment where an entrepreneur faces an imperfect capital market and an investor faces moral hazard and uncertainty. Staged financing plays two roles in this model: to control risk and to mitigate moral hazard. Using parametric functions and...

We generalize the concept of Nash equilibrium to the concept of general Nash equilibrium such that it becomes applicable to more general games. We also generalize the concept of general equilibrium in general equilibrium theory to a more general concept of general equilibrium such that it...

We introduce a new rationality criterion for games, which rules out many equilibria. Our selection principle is based on the argument that since the players know the set of poten-tial equilibria of a game, they will actively select an equilibrium in their own interest. We show the existence and...

In this paper, we propose an economic model to analyze the democratization of organizations. We justify several popular forms of democratization by economic efficiency. We find that ordinary members are always better off when their organization is more democratic. Even under the majority rule,...

This paper proposes a unique model of capacity utilization in which the firm varies capacity utilization by a variable number of shifts when facing demand fluctuations. In the long run, the firm optimally chooses a capacity level based on expected demand conditions. In the short run, when facing...

This paper studies the characteristics of optimal contracts when the agent is risk-averse in the double moral-hazard situation in which the principal also participates in the production process. It is already known that a simple linear contract is one of many optimal contracts under the double...

A long-standing deterrent to foreign direct investment in developing countries is weak enforcement of binding contracts. A local firm may learn business skills from a cooperating multinational firm and subsequently do business on its own based on the acquired skills. In a two-period...

This note offers a unified framework for all contractual relationships. In particular, it defines incomplete contracts and explains simple contracts. Although widely used in practice, incomplete contracts have not been well defined in the literature. The existing definitions of contracts are...

This book covers microeconomic theory at the Master's and Ph.D levels for students in business schools and economics departments. It concisely covers major mainstream microeconomic theories today, including neoclassical microeconomics, game theory, information economics, and contract theory