Firms have discretion over task allocations, which may dampen employees' career prospects, and, hence, motivation. Task assignments and worker motivation interact through the extent of labor market competition; that is, the possibility of moving to another firm. More competition enhances...

We study the impact of changes in the commitment power of a principal on cooperation among agents, in a model in which the principal and her agents are symmetrically uncertain about the agents' innate abilities. When the principal cannot commit herself to long-term wage contracts, two types of...

We propose a model of political career incentives and corruption, and take it to the lab. As predicted by the model, moral incentives and the desire for reelection interact to refrain politicians from taking bribes in the early stage of their careers. Treatments with weaker reelection incentives...

I present a model in which (1) a more talent-demanding task increases both rewards for high talent and the penalty for low talent due to a greater fixed cost of production, and (2) individual talent is task-specific and talent updates occur only for tasks near the attempted task, which implies a...

We introduce career concerns into rank-order tournaments and offer a novel explanation for the pervasiveness of multiple prizes. We argue that career-concerned individuals, already facing market pressure to perform, will be reluctant to participate in winner-take-all competitions. To entice them...