This paper presents a framework for evaluating whether a firm lacks dominance in a particular market despite manifesting relatively high market shares. We show that demand complementarities and high price-cost margins combine with multi-market participation to reduce the significance of market...

We employ a Cournot model with interdependent demands to explore the interaction between demand and cost complementarities in mitigating upward pricing pressure, post-merger. The analysis reveals that even substantial increases in the HHI post-merger need not raise competitive concerns when...

This paper examines price level regulation in two-sided markets with linear demands. We find that (i) price level regulation increases the price allocation asymmetry when reservation prices differ between the two sides of the market; and (ii) changes in the level of the price cap are divided...

This paper integrates two separate branches of the law and economics literature to demonstrate the two-sided risk of market exclusion by a vertically-integrated firm (VIF) with upstream and downstream market power. The ratio of retail to wholesale price-cost margins is key. A margin ratio that...

This note reveals that while the monopolist has ideal incentives to innovate, consistent with Schumpeter’s original hypothesis, the oligopolist’s incentive to innovate is non-monotonic in its market share and approaches that of the monopolist in the limit as the number of identical firms...

This paper integrates two separate branches of the law and economics literature to demonstrate the two-sided risk of market exclusion by a vertically-integrated firm (VIF) with upstream and downstream market power. The ratio of downstream (retail) to upstream (wholesale) price margins is key to...

This report is designed to be a self-contained introduction to performance-based regulation (PBR) with an emphasis on the energy sector in North America. The main topics include: key differences between PBR and traditional cost-of-service regulation (COSR), the various forms of PBR and their...

An essential input price that is “too high” relative to the downstream price leads to inefficient foreclosure and one that is “too low” induces the vertically-integrated firm to engage in non-price discrimination. Displacement ratios are used to derive the range of safe harbor...

When parents with concave utility reward good behaviour on the part of their children with a share of the marginal utility they derive from good behaviour, a decrease in good behaviour by kid i causes kid j to increase the amount of good behaviour he/she supplies in equilibrium. This may explain...