Coordination problems amongst creditors are reduced when a firm's debt structure is concentrated in fewer debt types. Using a sample of US non-financial firms, we show that an increase in risk-taking incentives in CEO pay is associated with a greater debt concentration by debt type. This result...

Banks are growing ever larger compared to their national economies. We show that increases in relative bank size (measured as a bank's liabilities divided by national GDP) are linked to banks displaying higher tail risk. This effect is not entirely due to risk channels that disproportionately...

Using a unique international dataset, we show that the CEOs of large banks exhibit an increased probability of forced turnover when their organizations are more exposed to idiosyncratic tail risks. The importance of idiosyncratic tail risk in CEO dismissals is strengthened when there is more...

We analyze whether four market-based measures of the global systemic importance of financial institutions offer early warning signals during three financial crises. The tests based on the 2007/2008 crisis show that only one measure (∆CoVaR) consistently adds predictive power to conventional...

Outside CEOs from non-financial firms match with boards of lending-oriented banks and are sought for their networks. They do not improve board advising and monitoring but their appointment results in lending expansion, increased bank CEO compensation, and more bank debt for their firms. The...