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We consider the role of the common prior for robust implementation in an environment with interdependent values. Specifically, we investigate a model of public good provision which allows for negative and positive informational externalities. In the corresponding direct mechanism, the agents'...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012775991
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014256254
A social choice rule (SCR) $F$ maps preference profiles to lotteries over some finite set of outcomes. $F$ is virtually implementable in (pure and mixed) Nash equilibria provided that for all $\epsilon 0$, there exists a mechanism such that for each preference profile $\theta$, its set of Nash...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012888913
A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves outcomes consistent with a social choice function. We identify a robust monotonicity condition that is necessary and (with mild extra assumptions) sufficient for robust implementation. Robust...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014064111
We consider the implementation of social choice functions under complete information in rationalizable strategies. A strict (and thus stronger) version of the monotonicity condition introduced by Maskin (1999) is necessary under the solution concept of rationalizability. Assuming the social...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014199374
A social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the process of iteratively eliminating strictly dominated messages leads to outcomes that agree with the social choice function for all beliefs at every type profile. In an interdependent value environment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012765273
This note studies (full) implementation of social choice functions under complete information in (correlated) rationalizable strategies. The monotonicity condition shown by Maskin (1999) to be necessary for Nash implementation is also necessary under the more stringent solution concept. We show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014207937
Cooperation in one-shot anonymous interactions is a widely documented aspect of human behaviour. Here we shed light on the motivations behind this behaviour by experimentally exploring cooperation in a one-shot continuous-strategy Prisoner's Dilemma (i.e. one-shot two-player Public Goods Game)....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013033737
We review the theory of fairness as it pertains to concretely specified problems of resource allocations. We present punctual notions designed to evaluate how well individuals, or groups, are treated in relation to one another: no-envy, egalitarian-equivalence, individual and collective lower or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025187