I study an evolutionary model of equilibrium selection in supermodular games where players are involved in simultaneous play. This is taken to refer to a context, in contrast with most evolutionary literature, where players' objective is to have their actions match a certain statistic of the...

We apply the dynamic stochastic framework proposed by recent evolutionary literature to the class of strict supermodular games when two simple behavior rules coexist in the population, imitation and myopic optimization.

This paper deals with a simple, Keynesian growth model. The main issue is whether Nash bargaining about wages may help to avoid cycles. Our result comes somewhat in the negative: Cycles may still persist. Their existence or emergence is related to violent investment behavior near the long-run,...

We consider zero-monotonic environments with transferable utility and propose a simple non-cooperative game to determine how the surplus generated by cooperation is to be shared. First, the players bid for the right to propose a sharing of the surplus. Second, after the winner pays the bids, she...

A long-standing conjecture is that winner-take-all games such as patent races lead to the survival of risk-takers and the extinction of risk-averters. In many species a winner-take-all game determines the males' right to reproduce, and the same argument suggests that males will evolve to be...

The main result of the paper is that policy reversals are more likely floowing realization of extreme and relatively unlikely values of parameters that map policy choice into outcomes. A corollary to this result is that policy reversals occur infrequently.

In this paper we replicate and extend the experiment of Fehr and Gaechter (2000) that analyzes the effect of an opportunity to punish others on the level contributions in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism.

This paper develops a general repeated game model over arbitrary time domain (which includes continuous time behaviour). A player is committed at any point in time to history independent behaviour for a positive length of time. The length of time of commitment depends on the way the history...