Contested director elections are a central feature of the corporate landscape, and underlie shareholder activism. Shareholders vote by unilateral proxies, which prevent them from “mixing and matching” among nominees from either side. The solution is universal proxies. The Securities and...

In 2012, the New York Stock Exchange changed its policies to prevent brokers voting shares on corporate governance proposals where they had not received instructions from beneficial owners. Although the change was intended to protect investors and improve corporate governance, it has had the...

Shareholders exert significant influence on the social and environmental behavior of U.S. corporations through their votes on social responsibility resolutions. However, the outcomes of many social responsibility resolutions are distorted, because the largest shareholders – institutional...

Nothing in either corporate or securities law requires companies to notify investors what they will be voting on before the record date for the meeting. We show that, overwhelmingly, they do not. The result is “hidden agendas:” in 88% of shareholder votes, investors cannot find out what they...

This is the seventh chapter of the book Corporations in 100 Pages (2020), authored by Holger Spamann, Scott Hirst, and Gabriel Rauterberg. The book is an introduction to corporate law for students and anyone else interested in the foundations of corporate law. The book provides an accessible,...

This is the fifth chapter of the book Corporations in 100 Pages (2020), authored by Holger Spamann, Scott Hirst, and Gabriel Rauterberg. The book is an introduction to corporate law for students and anyone else interested in the foundations of corporate law. The book provides an accessible,...