Two deviations of alternating-offer bargaining behavior from economic theory are observed together, yet have been studied separately. Players who could secure themselves a large surplus share if bargainers were purely self-interested incompletely exploit their advantage. Delay in agreement...

In this paper we study a two-player investment game with a first mover advantage in continuous time with stochastic payoffs, driven by a geometric Brownian motion. One of the players is assumed to be ambiguous with maxmin preferences over a strongly rectangular set of priors. We develop a...

We study a stochastic version of Fudenberg and Tirole's (1985) preemption game to analyze the effects of jumps in the underlying uncertainty on equilibrium strategies. Two firms contemplate entering a new market where the demand follows a jump-diffusion process. Firms differ is the sunk costs of...

Risks related to events that arrive randomly play important role in many real life decisions, and models of learning and experimentation based on two-armed Poisson bandits addressed several important aspects related to strategic and motivational learning in cases when events arrive at jump times...

We study a stochastic version of Fudenberg -- Tirole's preemption game. Two firms contemplate entering a new market with stochastic demand. Firms differ in sunk costs of entry. If the demand process has no upward jumps, the low cost firm enters first, and the high cost firm follows. If leader's...

Models of learning and experimentation based on two-armed Poisson bandits addressed several important aspects related to strategic and motivational learning, but they are not suitable to study effects that accumulate over time. We propose a new class of models of strategic experimentation which...

Maxmin or minmax optimization problems arise in many applications. There is a classical connection between these problems and zero-sum games. This paper shows that, under certain conditions, maxmin solutions also arise from Nash equilibria of population games as studied in evolutionary game...

We study a dynamic Stackelberg differential game between a buyer and a seller of insurance policies in a spectrally negative Lévy framework, in which both parties are ambiguous about the intensity and severity of insurable losses. Both the buyer and seller aim to maximize their expected wealth,...

An entrepreneur contracts with a consultant, who is protected by limited liability, to supply information about the state of a project prior to investing in it. For a given level of investment, a good project succeeds with higher probability than a bad one. The entrepreneur makes an upfront...