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Upsetting Deals and Reform Loop : Can Companies and M&A Law in Europe Adapt to the Market for Corporate Control?

Gatti, Matteo - 2019

overreactive in nature, stymie the market, and create new opportunities for regulatory arbitrage. This is not surprising: takeover …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012898923

Information Conduit or Agency Cost : Top Management and Director Interlock between Acquirers and Targets

Wu, Qingqing - 2017

This paper investigates the role of top management and board interlocks between acquirers and targets. I hypothesize that an interlock may exacerbate agency problems due to conflicting interests and lead to value-decreasing acquisition. An interlock may also serve as a conduit of information and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012975768

Takeovers, Poison Pills and Protectionism in Comparative Corporate Governance

Hill, Jennifer G. - 2020

The regulation of hostile takeovers constitutes an interesting corporate governance microcosm. It is an area where … clear contrasts in approach, regarding the balance of power between shareholders and the board of directors, are evident … across different jurisdictions. Takeovers also reflect the dynamic operation of legal regulation (which includes the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012857505

Staggered Boards, Unequal Voting Rights, Poison Pills and Innovation Intensity : New Evidence from the Asian Markets

Mbanyele, William - 2021

This study examines the impact of staggered boards, poison pills, and unequal voting rights on corporate innovation intensity using a sample of listed firms in six Asian countries from 2010-2017. We analyze the differential effects of antitakeover provisions using the high order fixed effects...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013249988

Value creation in M&A transactions, conference calls, and shareholder protection

Fraunhoffer, Robert M.; Kim, Ho Young; Schiereck, Dirk - In: International Journal of Financial Studies : open … 6 (2018) 1, pp. 1-21

This study investigates whether conference calls accompanying M&A announcements in Europe provide valuable information for capital market participants and hence induce an abnormal stock price revaluation on the bidder’s equity. Based on handpicked data for transactions between 2008 and 2012 we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011848217

The Power to Decide on Takeovers : Directors or Shareholders, What Difference Does It Make?

Gatti, Matteo - 2014

contribution is to show who actually has power in a takeover and what factors are at work to give such power. Although directors … lack the power to determine the outcome of a takeover bid, the reason for that is not embedded in the takeover regime …I analyze the allocation of the power to decide on hostile takeovers between directors and shareholders. My …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014153473

Investor Sentiment and Antitrust Law as Determinants of Corporate Ownership Structure : The Great Merger Wave of 1897 to 1903

Cheffins, Brian R. - 2010

A great merger wave occurring in the United States between 1897 and 1903 was the single most important event in a process that yielded the pattern of managerial control and dispersed share ownership which currently distinguishes America's corporate economy from arrangements in most other...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014103270

Governance, CEO Power, and Acquisitions

Oler, Derek; Olson, Bradley; Skousen, Christopher J. - 2009

power, but superior governance is associated with greater relatedness between the target and acquirer. We also find that the … effect of CEO power on a firm’s acquisition activity varies according to the source of that power. Our results suggest that … the relationships between governance, CEO power, and acquisition activity are complex …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014049776

The political economy of dominant investors

Perotti, Enrico C.; Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig von - 2005

We allow the preference of a political majority to determine boththe corporate governance structure and the division of profits betweenhuman and financial capital. In a democratic society where financialwealth is concentrated, a political majority may prefer to restraingovernance by dispersed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011337975

Performance benefits of tight control

Gill, Andrej; Visnjic, Nikolai - 2013

This study investigates the transition from being a listed company with a dispersed ownership structure to being a privately held company with a concentrated ownership structure. We consider a sample of private equity backed portfolio companies to evaluate the consequences of the corporate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010225758