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Stability and immunity to capacity manipulation in large matching markets

Honarvar, Morteza; Kamali Shahdadi, Behrang - In: Economics letters 206 (2021), pp. 1-5

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012887005

Mechanism design meets priority design : redesigning the US Army's branching process

Greenberg, Kyle; Pathak, Parag A.; Sönmez, Tayfun - 2021

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012547285

Assignment maximization

Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz; Bó, Inácio Guerberoff Lanari; … - 2020

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012243294

Assignment maximization

Afacan, Mustafa Oðuz; Bó, Inácio Guerberoff Lanari; … - 2018

, fairness, and implementation impossibilities. Despite that, we present two classes of mechanisms that maximize assignments. The …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011793994

Transparency and fairness in school choice mechanisms

Hermstrüwer, Yoan - 2019

assumptions in matching theory, I show that the Boston mechanism improves perceived fairness. These results underscore the … importance of procedural information and suggest that eliminating justified envy may not be a sufficient condition of fairness. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012041733