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Stability in large matching markets with complementarities

Ashlagi, Itai; Braverman, Mark; Hassidim, Avinatan - In: Operations research 62 (2014) 4, pp. 713-732

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010403174

Meisner, Vincent; Wangenheim, Jonas von - 2021

Evidence suggests that participants in direct student-proposing deferred-acceptance mechanisms (DA) play dominated strategies. To explain the data, we introduce expectation-based loss aversion into a school-choice setting and characterize choice-acclimating personal equilibria in DA. We find...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012698801

Economic engineering and the design of matching markets : the contributions of Alvin E. Roth

Jackson, Matthew O. - In: The Scandinavian journal of economics 115 (2013) 3, pp. 619-639

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009778347

Broadening the market design approach to school choice

Cantillon, Estelle - In: Oxford review of economic policy 33 (2017) 4, pp. 613-634

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011952540

Market design for living-donor organ exchanges : an economic policy perspective

Sönmez, Tayfun; Ünver, M. Utku - In: Oxford review of economic policy 33 (2017) 4, pp. 676-704

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011952563

Assignment mechanisms under distributional constraints

Ashlagi, Itai; Saberi, Amin; Shameli, Ali - In: Operations research 68 (2020) 2, pp. 467-479

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012213358

Efficient dynamic barter exchange

Anderson, Ross; Ashlagi, Itai; Gamarnik, David; … - In: Operations research 65 (2017) 6, pp. 1446-1459

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011777756

Everyone likes to be liked : experimental evidence from matching markets

Opitz, Timm; Schwaiger, Christoph - 2023

Matching markets can be unstable when individuals prefer to be matched to a partner who also wants to be matched with … preferences exist, significantly decrease stability in matching markets, and are driven both by belief-based and preference …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014476792

Reciprocal preferences in matching markets

Opitz, Timm; Schwaiger, Christoph - 2023 - This version: February 2023

paper, we introduce and formalize reciprocal preferences, apply them to matching markets, and analyze the implications for … acceptance mechanism can achieve stability. These results provide insights into non-standard preferences in matching markets, and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014478421

Informational hold up and intermediaries

Utgoff, Naomi - In: Games 13 (2022) 5, pp. 1-14

Why do some incomplete information markets feature intermediaries while others do not? I study the allocation of two goods in an incomplete information setting with a single principal, multiple agents with unit demand, and interdependent valuations. I construct a novel dynamic mechanism...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418049

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