the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism versus the Iterative Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (IDAM), a matching …

We introduce a new mechanism for matching students to schools or universities, denoted Iterative Deferred Acceptance …), the matching that is produced is the Student Optimal Stable Matching. Moreover, under imperfect information, students …

-sided matching models. We show that the NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness properties. We then propose two new … advocated for its superior fairness property, besides others. We introduce a new framework for school-choice problems and two … notions of fairness in lottery design based on ex-ante stability. This framework unifies known many-to-one and one …

Two-sided matching platforms can control and optimize over many aspects of the search for partners. To understand how … matching platforms should be designed, we introduce a dynamic two-sided search model with strategic agents who must bear a cost …

We present a survey of the emerging literature on the design of matching markets. We survey the articles on discrete …