Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to present novel empirical findings regarding the shareholder-management agency problem. Design/Methodology/Approach – The paper presents new evidence regarding the shareholder-management agency problem. It expands the set of factors that may cause...

The shift in pension coverage from defined benefit plans to 401(k)s has been underway since 1981. This shift is the result of three developments: 1) the addition of 401(k) provisions to existing thrift and profit sharing plans; 2) a surge of new 401(k) plan formation in the 1980s; and 3) the...

We show a dark-side view of internal capital markets in which one segment exploits the funding advantage of another profitable segment to relax its financial constraints. Results demonstrate that bank holding companies (BHCs) shield their nonbank segments, and not their bank segments, from...

This paper studies whether debt renegotiation mitigates debt overhang and improves investment efficiency. Using mergers between lenders participated in the same syndicated loans as natural experiments that exogenously reduce the number of lenders and thus make renegotiation easier, I find that...

This paper studies how the conflict of interest between shareholders and creditors affects corporate payout policy. Using mergers between lenders and equity holders of the same firm as shocks to the shareholder-creditor conflict, I show that firms pay out less when there is less conflict between...

Most investor coordination remains undisclosed. I provide empirical evidence on the extent and consequences of investor coordination in the context of hedge fund activism, in which potential benefits and costs from coordination are especially pronounced. In particular, I examine whether hedge...

We study the effect of investor horizons on a comprehensive set of corporate decisions. We argue that monitoring by long-term investors generates decision making that maximizes shareholder value. We find that long-term investors strengthen governance and restrain managerial misbehaviors such as...

Over the past two decades, hedge fund activism has emerged as a new mechanism of corporate governance that brings about operational, financial and governance reforms to a corporation. Many prominent business executives and legal scholars are convinced that the entire American economy will suffer...

Passive institutional investors are an increasingly important component of U.S. stock ownership. To examine whether and by which mechanisms passive investors influence firms' governance, we exploit variation in ownership by passive mutual funds associated with stock assignments to the Russell...