existence of equilibrium. We then apply the solution concept to a matching-based Cournot model in which the unit production cost … technology and human capital are complementary, the positive assortative matching (PAM) is a stable matching under rational … marginal effects of technology and human capital, the PAM is still a rational stable matching. However, if the substitutive …

Since no stable matching mechanism can induce truth-telling as a dominant strategy for all participants, there is often … room in matching markets for strategic misrepresentation (Roth [25]). In this paper we study a natural form of strategic …

-sided matching markets, such as school choice, labour markets and kidney exchange, relies on both theory as well as on empirical …The Nobel prize in economics in 2012 was awarded to Lloyd S. Shapley and Alvin E. Roth for “the theory of stable … foundations of the theory of stable allocations (in particular the celebrated deferred-acceptance algorithm) as well as the …

matching problem. A novel aspect of this matching problem is the moral hazard component on the part of counsel. Within the … model, we show that holding the total expenditure for counsel fixed and changing the matching procedure to accommodate … defendants' and attorneys' preferences will make defendants worse off. More precisely, if we switch from random matching to …

This paper empirically studies a decentralized dynamic peer-to-peer matching market. We use data from a leading ride … algorithm can increase the number of matches by making matches less frequently and matching agents more assortatively …

We model platform markets with the matching-with-contracts framework. The solution concept in matching with contracts …

Vulnerability to manipulation is a threat to successful matching market design. However, some manipulation is often …

We study a one-to-one two-sided matching market in which each man has a common value for all women and a private value … which a woman proposes to a random man in each step. We prove that envy in a matching market is bounded by envy in this … of the square root of the number of men in each type. Therefore, in large matching markets, envy becomes zero; on top of …

In this paper, I investigate matching problems where priorities and preferences are misaligned. In the case of … realization of their aptitudes (colleges' preferences) due to measurement errors. I show that in this case any matching mechanism …-sided centralized matching and two-sided decentralized early admissions. In the experiment, the Boston mechanism under pre …