I study the effect of timing of negotiation on the resolution of the hold-up problem. I show that the investor can invest optimally, if the non-investor can commit to initiate negotiation in a specific time period. This way I demonstrate that contracting parties can use negotiation timing...

I use the standard screening model to study the relationship between bribes and red tape. I argue that bribe-taking bureaucrats extract bribes by exploiting differences in firms' marginal costs of red tape and offer a menu of bribes and paperwork processing times, where a larger bribe is...

I study the effect of secret and public reserve prices on the seller’s revenue. In particular, I analyze the data from eBay auctions on tractors to estimate the extent of this effect. The analysis helps to explain the following empirical facts from Ebay auctions: multiple relisting of similar...

Bribe-extorting bureaucrats initiate disputes to extract bribes that firms are not willing to pay. Bureaucrats screen out firms with resources to pay bribes by offering a menu of bribes and paperwork processing delays during disputes. Although firms that face disputes are more profitable as a...

I study a hybrid bargaining model with an English auction in each state. The seller uses auctions to extract information about the bidders’ values of the object on sale. The bargaining element is introduced to maximize revenue, since the winning bidder has to exceed not only the second-highest...

We find sale prices and net revenues received by sellers in the Midwestern club pig market are higher at traditional face-to-face auctions than at comparable Internet auctions. The comparison overcomes adverse selection issues that commonly plague such analyses by using data from sellers that...