We modify the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model of banking to jointly study various regulations in the presence of credit and run risk. Banks choose between liquid and illiquid assets on the asset side, and between deposits and equity on the liability side. The endogenously determined asset...

A bank's decision on loan supply and capital structure determines its immediate bankruptcy risk as well as the future availability of internal funds. These internal funds in turn determine a bank's future costs of external finance and future vulnerability to bankruptcy risks. We study these...

The industrial organization approach to banking is extended to analyze the effects of interbank market activity and regulatory liquidity requirements on bank behavior. A multi-stage decision situation allows for considering the interaction between credit risk and liquidity risk of banks. This...

Pierret (2015) presents empirical analysis of the solvency-liquidity nexus for the banking system, documenting that a shock to the level of banks' solvency risk is followed by lower short-term debt. Conversely, higher short-term debt Granger-causes higher solvency risk. These results point...

Short-term debt is commonly used to fund illiquid assets. A conventional view asserts that such arrangements are run-prone in part because redemptions must be processed on a first-come, first-served basis. This sequential service protocol, however, appears absent in the wholesale banking...

We develop a theoretical model examining the financial stability policy of a central bank serving as both the lender of last resort and the regulator of the financial system. The model accommodates the possibility of financial contagion through interbank market linkages, and adverse feedback...

Short-term debt is commonly used to fund illiquid assets. A conventional view asserts that such arrangements are run-prone in part because redemptions must be processed on a first-come, first-served basis. This sequential service protocol, however, appears absent in the wholesale banking...

We evaluate how the liquidity coverage rule affects US banks' opacity and funding liquidity risk. Banks subject to the rule become significantly more opaque and funding liquidity risk increases by $245 million per quarter. Higher funding liquidity risk is more pronounced among banks that are...

We quantify the gains from regulating maturity transformation in a model of banks which finance long-term assets with non-tradable debt. Banks choose the amount and maturity of their debt trading off investors' preference for short maturities with the risk of systemic crises. Pecuniary...