We model dynamic bank capital structure under three optimally-designed regulatory regimes dealing with potential default { bailout, where government provides capital; bail-in, using private-sector funds; and no regulatory intervention, allowing failure. Only under optimally designed bail-in do...

The recent crisis has shown that systemically relevant banks in distress are likely to benefit from governmental support. This reduces their downside risk and leads to moral hazard, i.e. to incentives for these banks to assume excessive risks. In this paper we show empirically that implicit...

Are bank resolution regimes effective enough to improve financial stability? We look at the effect of the new bank resolution reforms on the systemic risk of big financial conglomerates. We find that in developed countries, parents in a stricter resolution regime have lower systemic risk...

We develop a model of bank risk-taking with strategic sovereign default risk. Domestic banks invest in real projects and purchase government bonds. While an increase in bond purchases crowds out profitable investments, it improves the government's incentives to repay and therefore lowers its...

Rather than taking on more risk, US insurers hit hard by the crisis pulled back from risk taking, relative to insurers hit less hard by the crisis. Capital requirements alone do not explain this risk reduction: insurers hit hard reduced risk within assets with identical regulatory treatment....

We show that systemic risk in the banking sector breeds macroeconomic uncertainty. We develop a model of a production economy with a banking sector where financial constraints of banks can lead to disastrous banking panics. We find that a higher probability of a banking panic increases...

We evaluate the abnormal returns of issuing and non-issuing banks around the announcement of Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) and explore how the market reaction is influenced by aggregate systemic conditions and by the systemic risk contribution and exposure of banks. While we find evidence of...

This paper studies the relation between bank herding and financial system stability. I develop a set of bank-specific, time-varying measures of herding in asset, liability, and off-balance sheet (OBS) portfolios and empirically examine the relation between bank herding and systemic risk...

We show that systemic risk in the banking sector breeds macroeconomic uncertainty. We develop a model of a production economy with a banking sector where financial constraints of banks can lead to disastrous banking panics. We find that a higher probability of a banking panic increases...

This paper investigates the role of banks foreign asset holdings in transmitting credit risk internationally. Foreign exposure in risky assets might severely a.ect the solvability of credit institutions. Credit risk, in turn, transfers from banks to public accounts as a consequence of implicit...