To date, macroprudential policy inspired by the Basel III package is applied irrespective of the network characteristics of the banking system. We study how the implementation of macroprudential policy in the form of additional capital requirements conditional to systemic-risk measures of banks...

Banking regulation routinely designates some assets as safe and thus does not require banks to hold any additional capital to protect against losses from these assets. A typical such safe asset is domestic government debt. There are numerous examples of banking regulation treating domestic...

In the recent financial crisis, risk management tools have been proven inadequate. Model risk, a key component of bank risk, has shown its negative impact. It seems that risk models did not cover the included risks comprehensively and were not kept up-to-date by banks, and also rating agencies....

Business cycles imply liquidity risks for banks. This paper explores how these risks influence bank lending over the cycle. With forward-looking banks, lending cycles, credit booms and busts, or suppressed and highly fragile bank systems can emerge, depending on the magnitude of liquidity risks....

This paper develops a macroprudential liquidity stress test model for Indonesian banks. Our model incorporates two factors driving liquidity runs: (i) idiosyncratic factors; and (ii) macroeconomic factors. We estimate this model using a sample of 113 banks over the period of January 2011 to June...

The Basel 3 Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) is a micro prudential instrument to strengthen the liquidity position of banks. However if in extreme scenarios the LCR becomes a binding constraint, the interaction of bank behaviour with the regulatory rule can have negative externalities. We simulate...

The notion that some banks are “too big to fail” builds on the premise that governments will offer support to avoid the adverse consequences of their disorderly failures. However, this promise of support comes at a cost: Large, complex, or interconnected banks might take on more risk if they...

Pierret (2015) presents empirical analysis of the solvency-liquidity nexus for the banking system, documenting that a shock to the level of banks' solvency risk is followed by lower short-term debt. Conversely, higher short-term debt Granger-causes higher solvency risk. These results point...

During the financial crisis, 114 European banks benefited from government support in Europe. We investigate the financial condition of banks before and after receiving state support using logit regressions. Our results indicate that the equity ratio, loan quality and bank size are the main...