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In the aftermath of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, flawed variable pay structures of executives were blamed by many for contributing to the build-up of the global financial turmoil, as they allegedly incentivized them to engage in excessive risk-taking. Legislators around the globe decided to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012824598
This paper examines the consequences of the increased use of performance vesting provisions in long-term incentive compensation for CEOs and other executives in the post-2006 period following FAS 123R. We re-examine the agency prediction that incentives provided by accounting or other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012972293
, CEO overconfidence, or matching of CEOs to select banks. We conclude that equity incentives (vega) embedded in CEO …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012975959
realignment of managers with relevant stakeholders of distressed firms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012851901
Many argue that the design of compensation contracts for public company chief executive officers (CEOs) is often not guided by a goal of value maximization. Yet, there is limited direct empirical evidence on the negative consequences of the proposed inefficient contracting between shareholders...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012853379
The large compensation received by bank executives is among the many factors blamed for the risk-taking that led to the 2008-2009 financial crisis. We test whether and how pay disparities between CEO and non-CEO executives—the so-called CEO pay gap—influenced risk taking at publicly traded...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012858941
We study pay spillovers within the network of peer compensation benchmarking and show that these can reconcile growth differences and convergence in CEO compensation. Specifically, compensation of a small group of prominent, highly-central network firms is shown to have a substantial spillover...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012860019
We report that the probability that executives exercise options early decreases with the volatility of the underlying stock return. We interpret this to mean that executives' subjective option value increases with volatility and that option grants increase executives' risk appetite. Further...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012986793
senior managers. However, the institutional factors associated with high levels of compensation of public managers are hardly … known. In particular, studies about the possible relation between factors of governance and compensation of public managers … insights for general reforms of governance aimed to support equitably levels of compensation of public managers and efficiency …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012924133
I document the richness of CEO compensation packages and show that boards learn about the desirability of the many complex package features through observing how these features are associated with firm performance. I first capture the detailed features of plan-based awards for CEOs of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012932128