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Endogenous labor market cycles
Li, Yunan; Wang, Cheng - In: International economic review 63 (2022) 2, pp. 849-881
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013280171
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ENDOGENOUS LABOR MARKET CYCLES
Li, Yunan; Wang, Cheng - In: International Economic Review 63 (2021) 2, pp. 849-881
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012809708
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Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification
Li, Yunan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 3, pp. 1139-1194
A principal distributes an indivisible good to budget‐constrained agents when both valuation and budget are agents' private information. The principal can verify an agent's budget at a cost. The welfare‐maximizing mechanism can be implemented via a two‐stage scheme. First, agents report...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806402
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Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments
Li, Yunan - In: Journal of economic theory 186 (2020), pp. 1-54
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415912
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Efficient mechanisms with information acquisition
Li, Yunan - In: Journal of economic theory 182 (2019), pp. 279-328
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012133305
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Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values
Li, Yunan - In: Games and economic behavior 103 (2017), pp. 225-253
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011792307
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Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification
Li, Yunan - In: Theoretical Economics 16 (2021) 3, pp. 1139-1194
A principal distributes an indivisible good to budget-constrained agents when both valuation and budget are agents' private information. The principal can verify an agent's budget at a cost. The welfare-maximizing mechanism can be implemented via a two-stage scheme. First, agents report their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189054
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Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification
Li, Yunan - In: Theoretical Economics 16 (2021) 3, pp. 1139-1194
A principal distributes an indivisible good to budget‐constrained agents when both valuation and budget are agents' private information. The principal can verify an agent's budget at a cost. The welfare‐maximizing mechanism can be implemented via a two‐stage scheme. First, agents report...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012637448
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Efficient mechanisms with information acquisition
Li, Yunan - 2016
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011453050
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Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments
Li, Yunan - 2016 - Latest version
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011453066