The improper use of inside information, governed by EU Regulation No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on market abuse (MAR) consists of three types of conduct: two of them, known as ‘insider dealing' (or insider trading), are described under Article...

I show that public companies disproportionately disclose positive news on days when corporate executives sell shares under predetermined Rule 10b5-1 plans. I find that the likelihood, share volume and dollar volume of insider sales under 10b5-1 plans are higher when good news is disclosed, and...

In this study, insider trading activity is used as part of a managerial compensation structure. The wage structure changes with the tenure duration of the insider. Managers with shorter tenure rely more on insider profits as part of their compensation. On the other hand, managers with longer...

This paper analyzes the impact of both penal law and prosecution of insider trading on the informational efficiency of securities markets. We show that increasing the severity of penalties to insider trading as well as making insider prosecution more efficient might improve the price discovery...

The term “inside information” is key to both the EU insider trading prohibition and the European continuous disclosure requirement. Artt. 2-4 Market Abuse Directive (MAD) prevent market participants from trading on, disclosing, and making investment recommendations on the basis of inside...

We examine derivatives trading prior to takeover rumors in a sample of 1,638 publicly traded U.S. firms. The volume of options traded is abnormally high over the 5-day pre-rumor period, primarily due to the number of out-of-the-money call options traded. In addition, the direction of option...

This paper examines how the quality of firm information disclosure affects shareholders' use of dividends to mitigate agency problems. Managerial compensation is linked to firm value. However, because the manager and shareholders are asymmetrically informed, the manager can manipulate the firm's...

This paper studies firms’ information withholding in a mandatory environmental disclosure regime where regulators only allow firms to withhold information regarded as a trade secret. I find evidence of withholding information for reasons other than proprietary-cost concerns, which is...

Financial executives of firms engaged in forward contracting have raised concerns that mandated disclosure of those contracts would reveal proprietary information to rival firms. This paper considers the basis for those concerns in the framework of a duopoly in which one privately informed...