Abstract: The recent paper by Goetzmann et al. (2002) suggests that fund managers subject to a performance review have an adverse incentive to engage in portfolio strategies that have theunfortunate attribute that they can expose the fund investor to significant downside risk.(...)

We show how core assumptions on risk preferences and risk distributions in the microstructure literature shape its conclusions for investment demand curves in equilibrium. In particular, we show that the assumptions of CARA preferences and joint normality of exogenous risk factors and payoffs...

Whilst researchers extensively investigate executive incentives, very little appears in the literature on the effect of outside-director ‘skin in the game' on board monitoring and thus firm performance. Utilizing a unique panel dataset, we observe a sizeable positive relationship between...

Although recent research show that institutional informed trading can spur CEOs to work harder and reduce agency costs even for firms with dispersed ownership structure, it leaves unaddressed the ultimate impact of informed trading on firm value. This paper provides empirical evidence and finds...

We examine the expected economic benefits of mergers and acquisitions. We conclude that both signaling and revelation biases are responsible for the commonly reported finding that on average takeovers are harmful to bidder shareholder wealth. After accounting for these two biases that lead to a...

The traditional view on CEO pay suggests that the use of equity-based incentives (e.g., stocks and options) should increase when stock prices become more informative about managerial action. In this paper, we show this is only true in the relative sense, when comparing with CEOs'...

This paper develops a labor-market orientated expected utility model to explain the massively high level of non-marital fertility, especially teenage single motherhood in the United States in the period 1960-1980. Labor market regulations reduce, via disemployment, male youth income-earning...

We show in a fairly general setting of a buyer and seller with the same preferences trading two related assets so as to share volatility risk that illiquidity and virtually all impediments to trade cannot be priced. This is because the buying and selling counterparties must both be optimizing....