We exposit an integrated agency model of multi-period career concerns and labor market equilibrium with managerial reservation utility levels, and thus pay levels, determined endogenously for firms of different sizes. Based on observations from a long time-series of S&P 1500 companies, we...

The role of institutional investors on the register constitutes a significant puzzle. Concentrated investors could intervene (i.e., exercise 'voice') so as to improve firm governance mechanisms. Alternatively, acting as informed traders, they could effectively discipline management if they adopt...

A number of results in liquidity asset pricing and market microstructure depend on the assumption that, when investors trade strategically, recognizing limited market participation (i.e. thin markets), trade volume impacts prices linearity with respect to order size. The assumption is usually...

Adding a motivation for trading due to endowment differences to standard asset pricing assumptions, we investigate the impact of illiquidity due to small numbers of participants. We calibrate to observed activity levels, returns, transaction costs and volatility in equity markets. We show that,...

We investigate monitoring of CEO incentives and pay levels by institutional investors. Consistent with the microstructural monitoring equilibrium of Noe (2002), we show that option-grant pay-performance sensitivity is positively related to institutional trading intensity. Trading intensity also...

CEO flow incentives, both stock options and bonuses, are positively related to measures of firm market valuation and operating performance suggesting incentives are an important mechanism to align CEO interests with shareholders. These findings are robust to alternative measures of firm...

Adding a motivation for trading due to endowment differences to standard asset pricing assumptions, we investigate the impact of illiquidity due to small numbers of participants. We calibrate to observed activity levels, returns, transaction costs and volatility in equity markets. We show that,...

Using a matched sample of firms that do and do not undertake major investments we find that CEO incentives with option-based asymmetric payoffs greatly increase the likelihood that a firm will increase risk by undertaking both major real investments and acquisitions. In contrast, equity-based...

We propose a new measure of individual security timing ability as distinct from (aggregate) market timing ability. Security timing captures the proportion of potential returns generated by the fund manager over an evaluation period. Using a unique database of daily transactions, we examine the...

We evaluate the impact of stock market transparency and opacity design features on global trading activity, including the share of traded value for cross-listed stocks. Our methodology relies on a system of simultaneous structural equations estimated for the world's major exchanges. We find that...