We discuss what lessons market participants and regulators might draw from ongoing disputes. Per Hellström & Thomas Kramler (DG Comp)

The current patent environment’s stress on competition and innovation has caused several detrimental market effects. Ilene K. Gotts (Wachtell Lipton) & Scott A. Sher (Wilson Sonsini)

The current fining practices in single-firm conduct cases rest on shaky grounds and are potentially harmful. Benoît Durand (RBB Economics) & Andreas P. Reindl (Leuphana University)

This paper applies an intuitive approach based on stock market data to a unique dataset of large concentrations during the period 1990–2002 to assess the effectiveness of European merger control. The basic idea is to relate announcement and decision abnormal returns. Under a set of four...

When firms' research can lead to potentially harmful innovations, public intervention may thwart their incentives to undertake research by reducing its expected profitability (average deterrence) and may guide the use of innovation (marginal deterrence). We compare four policy regimes: laissez...

The precise significance of innovation in EU competition law has remained, at best, opaque. Paul Lugard & David Cardwell (Baker Botts)

Law enforcement by regulatory authorities on complaints may replicate not only advantages but also disadvantages of both public and private enforcement. In Russian antitrust enforcement there are strong incentives to open investigations on almost every complaint. The increasing number of...

The empirical assessment of leniency program (LP) in Russia shows the effects of changes in the rules on the behavior of market participants. In this paper we test hypotheses about LP enforcement against the characteristics of cartels: their subject, duration and the number of participants. We...

The economics of crime and punishment postulates that higher punishment leads to lower crime levels, or less severe crime. It is however hard to get empirical support for this intuitive relationship. This paper o¤ers a model that contributes to explain why this is the case. We show that if...

This article studies the strategic interactions between cartelists and the antitrust agency in two theoretical game settings. In the simultaneous game, the numerical results show that it becomes harder for the firms to sustain collusion, but easier for the antitrust agency to detect collusion as...