While U.S. legislation prohibits employers from sharing information about their employees' compensation with each other, companies are still allowed to acquire and use more aggregated data provided by third parties. Most medium and large firms report using this type of data to set salaries, a...

While U.S. legislation prohibits employers from sharing information about their employees’ compensation with each other, companies are still allowed to acquire and use more aggregated data provided by third parties. Most medium and large firms report using this type of data to set salaries, a...

This paper examines the relationship between ethics and market design. It argues that market design should not rely wholly on preference utilitarianism in order to make ethical judgements. It exposits an alternative normative framework — informed neutrality between reasonable ethical positions

Policymakers frequently use price regulations as a response to inequality in the markets they control. In this paper, we examine the optimal structure of such policies from the perspective of mechanism design. We study a buyer‐seller market in which agents have private information about both...

We study a model of social learning with overlapping generations, where agents meet others and share data about an underlying state over time. We examine under what conditions the society will produce individuals with precise knowledge about the state of the world. Under the full information...

We propose an economic framework for determining priority rules for allocating a scarce supply of vaccines that gradually become available during a public health crisis, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. Agents differ in observable and unobservable characteristics, and the designer maximizes a...

A designer relies on a costly screening device to allocate a set of goods, aiming to maximize a social welfare function. We provide conditions for one screening device to dominate another. We show that the performance of a screening device depends on two channels: (i) targeting effectiveness...

For an incompatible patient-donor pair, kidney exchanges often forbid receipt-before-donation (the patient receives a kidney before the donor donates) and donation-before-receipt, causing a double-coincidence-of-wants problem. Our proposed algorithm, the Unpaired kidney exchange algorithm, uses...