We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the classical substitutes … condition to markets with externalities, we establish that stable matchings exist when agent choices satisfy substitutability …. We show that substitutability is a necessary condition for the existence of a stable matching in a maximal-domain sense …

We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the classical substitutes … condition to markets with externalities, we establish that stable matchings exist when agent choices satisfy substitutability …. We show that substitutability is a necessary condition for the existence of a stable matching in a maximal-domain sense …

characterize the existence of stable assignments in many-to-one matching problems with externalities. The set of stable matchings … bottom q-substitutability that guarantees the existence of at least one stable matching when the set of estimations includes …

make investments before matching in a competitive market. We introduce the notion of premune-ation values—the values to the …

efficient matching of workers to firms. This mechanism can be thought of as operated by a recruitment agency, an employment …

Federal Employment Agency and its internal placement-software. We use these data to estimate an enhanced matching function …

information is shared, externalities arise. The standard conditions for the two fundamental welfare theorems, thus, implicitly …