Monopolists selling complementary products charge a higher price in a static equilibrium than a single multiproduct monopolist would, reducing both the industry profits and consumer surplus. However, firms could instead reach a Pareto improvement by lowering prices to the single monopolist...

In this paper, we consider a model with a monopoly firm who sells social goods sequentially to a group of customers in a network. We show that, with symmetric social interactions, the optimal pricing under arbitrary launch sequence is independent of customers' network positions, the launch...

We study pricing strategies of competing firms that sell heterogeneous products to consumers in a social network. Goods are substitutes and there are network externalities between neighboring consumers. We show that there exists a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium where, in the first stage,...

This paper addresses a common problem in the petroleum industry, using techniques of real options in a cooperative game setting. It has the added twist of a network effect that encourages early development. In the model, two natural gas producers have adjacent undeveloped land with uncertain...

I study how strategic alliances and their impact on future competitive incentives can motivate interfirm equity sales. In the model, an alliance between an entrepreneurial firm and an established firm improves efficiency for both. However, the requisite knowledge transfer heightens the...

The past few years have witnessed the increasing ubiquity of user-generated content on seller reputation and product condition in Internet based used-good markets. Recent theoretical models of trading and sorting in used-good markets provide testable predictions to use to examine the presence of...

We examine the implications of different contractual forms for welfare as well as for firms’ profits in a framework in which a vertically integrated firm sells its good to an independent downstream firm. Under downstream Bertrand competition, the standard result of the desirability of two-part...

We investigate the differentiated duopoly and triopoly markets in which firms can choose to strategically delegate when the biased managers hold about the market demand incorrectly under Bertrand competition. Contrast to previous studies under duopoly, one firm chooses delegate, while the other...

This paper proposes a dynamic approach to modeling opportunism in bilateral vertical contracting between an upstream monopolist and competing downstream firms. Unlike previous literature on opportunism which has focused on games in which the upstream firm makes simultaneous secret offers to the...

We consider a vertically related market in which an upstream monopolistsupplier trades, via interim observable two-part tariff contracts, with twodifferentiated goods' downstream Cournot competitors. We show that passivepartial backward ownership (PPBO) may be pro-competitive and...