We assume that students can acquire a wage premium, thanks to studies, and form a rational expectation of their future … earnings, which depends on personal ability. Students receive a private, noisy signal of their ability, and universities can … of test scores. Students optimally self-select as a result of pricing only. If capital markets are perfect but …

We assume that students can acquire a wage premium, thanks to studies, and form a rational expectation of their future … earnings, which depends on personal "ability". Students receive a private, noisy signal of their ability, and universities can … of test scores. Students optimally self-select as a result of pricing only. If capital markets are perfect but …

A model is presented where universities competitively supply education to mobile students. Students are subject to a …-related debt relief, however, the equilibrium quality of education is inefficiently low. This is because students reduce their …

We study a structural model of college admissions framed as a contest between a continuum of students for enrollment in … a continuum of colleges where the contest outcome is decided by the students' choice of human capital (HC). Students … students, and means-tested affirmative action (AA). An AA ban would result in a large migration of minority students out of the …