managers privately know their project profitability and care about their company's short-term share price, managers of less …

Existing literature emphasizes skills-based explanations for executive-firm matching, namely in the context of … a financial expert. These managers are equally myopic, however financial experts are also privy to stock-market beliefs …. Financial experts invest sub-optimally due to catering incentives, while operational managers tend to engage in signaling …

We examine whether managers convey more information via voluntary disclosure channels when standard-setters limit … managers' discretion in GAAP. We estimate the extent to which standard setters limit managers' discretion by counting the … number of times obligatory modal verbs are mentioned in the text of each standard. Our primary findings indicate managers …

are undisclosed, whereas when disclosed, managers could either work harder or less diligently. Our work provides some … increases both pay-performance sensitivity and managers' total compensation …

, consistent with managers benefiting from lower pension contributions. Results are stronger when CEO compensation is directly …

rational managers engage in misreporting, in spite of the costly consequences. We present a simple extension to the Fischer and … in the reputation costs observed after a restatement, such that managers only reduce future bias if the observed cost of … based on more restatements. Our results indicate that rational managers use the insights from prior restatements to improve …