We consider platform competition in a two-sided market, where the two sides (buyers and sellers) have ex-ante uncertainty and ex-post asymmetric information concerning the value of a new technology. We find that platform competition may lead to a market failure: competition may result in a lower...

This paper considers platform competition in a two-sided market that includes buyers and sellers. One of the platforms benefits from a favorable coordination bias in the market, in that for this platform it is less costly than for the other platform to convince customers that the two sides will...

We consider platform competition in a two-sided market, where the two sides (buyers and sellers) have ex-ante uncertainty and ex- post asymmetric information concerning the value of a new tech- nology. We find that platform competition may lead to a market failure: competition may result in a...

We consider platform competition in a two-sided market, where the two sides (buyers and sellers) have ex-ante uncertainty and ex-post asymmetric information concerning the value of a new technology. We find that platform competition may lead to a market failure: competition may result in a lower...

We consider a methodology for studying how beliefs shape platform competition, based on the notion of a partial focality. The concept of focality is useful for modeling platform competition when the presence of network effects results in multiple equilibria for a certain set of prices. We...