The family plays a central role in decisions relative to the provision of long term care (LTC). We develop a model of family bargaining to study the impact of the distribution of bargaining power within the family on the choices of nursing homes, and on the location and prices chosen by nursing...

A central theme in the international debate on genetic testing concerns the extent to which insurance companies should be allowed to use genetic information in their design of insurance contracts. We analyze this issue within a model with the following important feature: A person s well-being...

Regulation fostering Managed Care alternatives in health insurance is spreading. This work reports on an experiment designed to measure the amounts of compensation asked by the Swiss population (in terms of reduced premiums) for Managed-Care type restrictions in the provision of health care. It...

This paper studies externalities of nationally determined cost-sharing systems, in particular coinsurance rates (patients pay a percentage of the price), under pharmaceutical parallel trade, i.e. trade outside the manufacturer's authorized distribution channel, in a two-country model with a...

Procurement within the NHS is attracting increasing research and policy interest. However, most of the emphasis has been on the buyer (the NHS), with less attention paid to the behaviour of suppliers (often pharmaceutical companies). For medical devices very little is publicly documented about...

In this paper we compare the properties in terms of rent extraction of Hotelling spatial competition and monopoly franchises using Dutch first price auctions, two of the most widely used tools to regulate public service provision. In a framework where the regulator can imperfectly observe costs,...

This paper investigates competition between health insurance companies under different financing regulations. We consider two alternatives advanced in recent German health care reform discussions: competition by contribution rates (health contributions) and by fees (health premia). We find that...

Risk classification refers to the use of observable characteristics by insurers to group individuals with similar expected claims, compute the corresponding premiums, and thereby reduce asymmetric information. Risk classification can be used to mitigate adverse selection and improve insurance...

We study optimal risk adjustment in imperfectly competitive health insurance markets when high-risk consumers are less likely to switch insurer than low-risk consumers. First, we find that insurers still have an incentive to select even if risk adjustment perfectly corrects for cost differences...

This paper investigates competition between health insurance companies under different financing regulations. We consider two alternatives advanced in recent German health care reform discussions: competition by contribution rates (health contributions) and by fees (health premia). We find that...