We study how uncertainty and risk aversion affect international agreements to supply global public goods. We consider a benchmark model with homogeneous countries and linear payoffs. When countries directly contribute to a public good, uncertainty tends to lower signatories' efforts but may...

We provide the first empirical application of a new approach proposed by Lee (2007) to estimate peer effects in a linear-in-means model. This approach allows to control for group-level unobservable and to solve the reflection problem. We investigate peer effects in student achievement in...

We provide the first empirical application of a new approach proposed by Lee (2007) to estimate peer effects in a linear-in-means model. The approach allows to control for group-level unobservables and to solve the reflection problem, without imposing ad hoc exclusion restrictions or requiring...

We provide the first empirical application of a new approach proposed by Lee (2007) to estimate peer effects in a linear-in-means model. This approach allows to control for group-level unobservables and to solve the reflection problem. We investigate peer effects in student achievement in...

We introduce uncertainty and risk aversion to the study of international environmental agreements. We consider a simple model with identical agents and linear payoffs. We show that a stable treaty with positive action always exists. While uncertainty lowers the actions of signatories, we find...

We propose a model of intergenerational transmission of education wherein children belong to either highly educated or low-educated families. Children choose the intensity of their social activities while parents decide how much educational effort to exert. Using data on adolescents in the...

There is substantial empirical evidence showing that peer effects matter in many activities. The workhorse model in empirical work on peer effects is the linear-in-means (LIM) model, whereby it is assumed that agents are linearly affected by the mean action of their peers. We provide two...

We consider a decision maker who is responsible for issuing flood warnings for the population. The population is uncertain about the credibility of the warnings and adjusts its beliefs following false alerts or missed events. We show that low credibility leads the decision maker to issue...

I present a behavioural model of network formation with positive network externalities in which individuals have preferences for being part of a clique. The behavioural model leads to an associated supermodular (Topkis, 1979) normal form game. I show that the behavioural model converges to the...