In this paper we introduce a stochastic network formation model where agents choose both actions and links. Neighbors … in the network benefit from each other's action levels through local complementarities and there exists a global …

This file contains Appendices A and B of the paper: "A Structural Model of Dense Network Formation" Original paper can …

This paper proposes an empirical model of network formation, combining strategic and random networks features. Payoffs …. Under mild assumptions, the network formation process is a potential game and converges to an exponential random graph model …

, I provide a proposition that generalizes the results of these two models by stating that: (i) Strict Nash network … network as in Billand et al (2011). This proposition requires that a certain restriction on link formation cost (called …

the collaboration network researchers create spillovers not only to their direct coauthors but also to researchers …

We introduce a simple two-stage game of endogenous network formation and information sharing for reasoning about the … then we study how the network design and the utility specifications affect welfare. Surprisingly, we find that in general … "babblers" or "friends", irrespective of whether the network is unilateral or bilateral, in equilibrium, targeted information …

respect to their network position while their names do not matter. Existence of certain stable network structures is then … empty or complete network are always pairwise stable, stable symmetric networks exist, or stable networks with a connected … pairwise stable network is an NSG if utility is given by Bonacich centrality. …

This paper studies a noncooperative model of network formation. Built upon the two-way flow model of Bala and Goyal …

We analyze a model of strategic network formation prior to a Manea (2011) bargaining game: ex-ante homogeneous players … form an undirected network with explicit linking costs anticipating expected equilibrium payoffs from the subsequent … sequential network bargaining. Assuming patient players, we provide a complete characterization of networks being pairwise (Nash …

Two project leaders (or entrepreneurs) in a network, which captures social relations, recruit players in a strategic … selects one equilibrium at a time. An agent's expected payoff is related to his position in the network, though no centrality …