We study how information sharing between banks influences the geographical clustering of branches. A spatial oligopoly model first explains why branches cluster and how information sharing impacts price competition and equilibrium clustering. With data on 59,333 branches of 676 banks in 22...

We study how information sharing between banks influences the geographical clustering of branches. A spatial oligopoly model first explains why branches cluster and how information sharing impacts price competition and equilibrium clustering. With data on 59,333 branches of 676 banks in 22...

We model the impact of bank mergers on loan competition, reserve holdings and aggregate liquidity. A merger changes the distribution of liquidity shocks and creates an internal money market, leading to financial cost efficiencies and more precise estimates of liquidity needs. The merged banks...

We model the impact of bank mergers on loan competition, banks' reserve holdings and aggregate liquidity. Banks compete in a differentiated loan market, hold reserves against liquidity shocks, and refinance in the interbank market. A merger creates an internal money market that induces financial...

We model the impact of bank mergers on loan competition, reserve holdings and aggregate liquidity. A merger creates an internal money market that affects reserve holdings and induces financial cost advantages, but also withdraws liquidity from the interbank market. Loan market competition...

We model the impact of bank mergers on loan competition, banks' reserve holdings and aggregate liquidity. Banks compete in a differentiated loan market, hold reserves against liquidity shocks, and refinance in the interbank market. A merger creates an internal money market that induces financial...

In this paper we focus on fair value measurements in the Financial Crisis and its (continuing) aftermath. We consider different ways of measuring fair value; and we use the experience of economies under stress, and where markets deviate significantly from textbook models of symmetric information...

Without regulation, securitization allowed mortgage industry actors to gain fees and to put off risks. During the housing boom, the ability to pass off risk allowed lenders and securitizers to compete for market share by lowering their lending standards, which activated more borrowing. Lenders...

We model the impact of bank mergers on loan competition, reserve holdings and aggregate liquidity. A merger creates an internal money market that affects reserve holdings and induces financial cost advantages, but also withdraws liquidity from the interbank market. Loan market competition...