Efforts to control bank risk address the wrong problem in the wrong way. They presume that the financial crisis was caused by CEOs who failed to supervise risk-taking employees. The responses focus on executive pay, believing that executives will bring non-executives into line — using...

In recent times, there has been an unprecedented shift in power from managers to shareholders, a shift that realizes the long-held theoretical aspiration of market control of the corporation. This Article subjects the market control paradigm to comprehensive economic examination and finds it...

Efforts to control bank risk address the wrong problem in the wrong way. They presume that the financial crisis was caused by CEOs who failed to supervise risk-taking employees. The responses focus on executive pay, believing that executives will bring non-executives into line - using incentives...

In this paper we analyze the problem of the enforcement of incomplete contracts with endogenous outside options. Some of the equilibria we outline may reverse one of the main results presented in the standard literature. We then revisit the literature on the highly debated Fisher Body/General...

In his novel contribution to the ongoing debate over executive compensation, Share Repurchases, Equity Issuances, and the Optimal Design of Executive Pay, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 1113 (2011), Professor Jesse M. Fried points to a problem that has been, as of yet, unexplored by legal scholars. He argues...

This internet appendix provides supplemental results as described in our paper "Blood in the Water: The Value of Antitakeover Provisions During Market Shocks", available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3716995

This Article makes two original contributions to the contract interpretation and renegotiation literatures. First, we introduce an under-explored cause of renegotiation failure: party uncertainty regarding the type of court that will interpret their contract. Parties may predict differently how...