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Director pay slice, the remuneration committee, and firm financial performance

Rahayu, Nadia Klarita; Harymawan, Iman; Nasih, Mohammad; … - In: Cogent economics & finance 10 (2022) 1, pp. 1-24

This study aimed to analyze the relationship between the director pay slice and firm financial performance. This study used 1024 observations from companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2011 to 2019. The analytical technique used in this study was ordinary least square regression...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013447896

The incentives for tax planning

Armstrong, Christopher; Blouin, Jennifer L.; Larcker, … - 2011 - Draft: March 8, 2011

We use a proprietary data set with detailed executive compensation information to examine the relationship between the incentives of the tax director and GAAP and cash effective tax rates, the book-tax gap, and measures of tax aggressiveness. We find that the incentive compensation of the tax...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009506609

Determinants and Performance Effects of Executive Pay Multiples

Hyun, Jeong-Hoon - 2012

Disclosure rules for the Korean Stock Exchange require Korean firms to disclose average executive and employee pay. These disclosures provide a unique opportunity to examine factors influencing the executive pay multiple (executive-employee pay disparity) and its effects on performance. We find...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013107909

Compensation Committees’ Treatment of Earnings Components in CEOs’ Terminal Years

Huson, Mark R. - 2013

non-terminal years, managers' compensation is partially shielded from the negative effects of SG&A expenditures, but this …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013092295

Noise Hedging and Executive Compensation

Doherty, Neil A. - 2013

We address two apparent paradoxes of risk management: (1) managers hedge in order to avoid negative earnings surprises …, yet they tend to hedge risks uninformative of the value of the company; and (2) the presence of options in managers … informational asymmetry between insiders (managers) and outsiders (investors). Investors derive information about company value from …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013092522

Clawback Provision of SOX, Financial Misstatements, and CEO Compensation Contracts

Natarajan, Ramachandra (Ram) - 2017

Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (hereafter, SOX), commonly known as the clawback provision, entitles the SEC to sue the CEO and CFO in an attempt to recover their incentive compensation based on misstated financial reports. While a stream of literature investigates the effects of voluntary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012964651

Performance-Vesting Provisions in Executive Compensation

Bettis, J. Carr - 2018

The usage of performance-vesting (p-v) equity awards to top executives in large U.S. companies has grown from 20 to 70 percent from 1998 to 2012. We measure the effects of p-v provisions on value, delta, and vega of equity-based compensation. We find large differences in the value of p-v awards...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012938441

Performance-Based Vesting Compensation and Debt Contracting

King, Tao-Hsien Dolly - 2019

This paper examines whether the risk-taking incentives induced by performance-based vesting (p-v) compensation influence bank loan contracting and credit ratings. Consistent with our risk-shifting hypothesis, we find that the p-v based compensation, as measured by the proportion of grant date...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012865414

How Powerful CFOs Camouflage and Exploit Equity-Based Incentive Compensation

Collins, Denton - 2017

While numerous studies have examined the impact that powerful CEOs have on their compensation and overall firm decisions, relatively little is known about how powerful CFOs influence their compensation and important firm financial reporting and operational outcomes. This is somewhat surprising...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012974079

Compensation Committees’ Treatment of Earnings Components in CEOs’ Terminal Years

Huson, Mark R. - 2017

non-terminal years, managers' compensation is partially shielded from the negative effects of selling, general, and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012974379