The repeated game literature studies long run/repeated interactions, aiming to understand how repetition may foster cooperation. Conditioning future behavior on past play is crucial in this endeavor. For most situations of interest a given player does not directly observe the actions chosen by...

This paper analyzes behavior in repeatedly played two-stage games, where players choose actions in both stages according to best replies using 'level-n expectations' about the opponent's actions in both stages. Level-n expectations are recursively defined in a way that a player holding level n...

In this paper, we study full implementation problem by mechanisms that allow delay. The delay on the equilibrium path may be zero, infinitesimally small or a fixed positive number. In all these three cases, implementable rules are characterized by a monotonicity-like condition alone, including...

We study a dynamic setting in which stochastic information about the value of a privately-informed seller's asset is gradually revealed to a market of buyers. We characterize the unique equilibrium in a continuous-time framework. The equilibrium involves periods of no trade or market failure....

Embarking from the concept of uniform payoff security (Journal of Econonomic Theory, Vol. 134, 2007), we introduce two other uniform conditions and then study the existence of mixed strategy Nash equilibria in games where the sum of the payoff functions is not necessarily upper semicontinuous

This paper considers the problem of equilibrium selection in a common-value second-price auction with two bidders. We show that for each ex post equilibrium in continuous and undominated strategies of the common-value auction, a sequence of "almost common-value" auctions can be constructed such...

Through building the statistical structure of game theory, this paper develops a paradigm of rationality and equilibrium to model collective and interactive behaviors for various economic ecologies from a perfect organizing corporation to a complete freedom population such as an anarchy. In...

We provide tight bounds on the rate of convergence of the equilibrium payoff sets for repeated games under both perfect and imperfect public monitoring. The distance between the equilibrium payoff set and its limit vanishes at rate (1 - delta)^{1/2} under perfect monitoring, and at rate (1 -...

We characterize full implementation of social choice sets in mixed strategy Bayesian equilibrium. Our results concern both exact and virtual mixed implementation. For exact implementation, we identify a strengthening of Bayesian monotonicity, which we refer to as mixed Bayesian monotonicity. It...

This note shows that the loss deviations in Selten's (1995) risk dominance measure are the same as the arguments of the probability of a strategy that supports a sequential equilibrium. Risk dominance is used to select among Nash equilibria, while sequential equilibrium, which is stronger than...