Eisenberg and Gale [1959] showed that market equilibrium in Fisher's model with linear utility functions could be obtained by maximizing a concave objective function subject to linear constraints. Eisenberg [1961] generalized this result to concave and linearly homogeneous functions. Eisenberg's...

In an economic model of exchange of goods, the structure can be specified by utility functions. Under utility conditions identified here even more broadly than usual, except for concavity in place of quasi-concavity, every equilibrium will simultaneously be stable with respect to shifts in the...

We introduce deep equilibrium nets—a deep learning-based method to compute approximate recursive equilibria of economic models featuring a substantial amount of heterogeneity, significant uncertainty, and occasionally binding constraints. Deep equilibrium nets are neural networks that directly...

The transformation of the European energy system requires substantial investment in transmission capacity to facilitate cross-border trade and to efficiently integrate renewable energy sources. However, network planning in the EU is still mainly a national prerogative. In contrast to other...

This research states the stylised n (more than two) players' splitting problem as a mathematical programme, relying on definitions of the values of the game and problem stationarity to generate tractable reduced forms, and derives the known solutions according to the properties of pertaining...

This paper is part I of a two-part paper. It proposes a two-stage game to analyze imperfect competition of producers in zonal power markets with a day-ahead and a real-time market. We consider strategic producers in both markets. They need to take both markets into account when deciding what to...

We provide a review of the types of equilibria typically found in operations management inventory papers and a discussion on when the commonly used stationary infinite-horizon (open-loop) equilibrium may be sufficient for study. We focus particularly on order-up-to and basestock equilibria in...

This chapter is devoted to the study of Nash equilibria, and correlated equilibria in both finite and infinite games. We restrict our discussions to only those properties that are somewhat special to the case of two-person games. Many of these properties fail to extend even to three-person...

This article proposes a two-stage oligopoly model for the crude oil market. In a game of several Stackelberg leaders, market power increases endogenously as the spare capacity of the competitive fringe goes down. This effect is due to the specific cost function characteristics of extractive...

We study the equilibrium in the model proposed by Kyle in 1985 and extended that we consider a framework where the price pressure can be random. We also allow for a random release time of the fundamental value of the asset. This framework includes all the particular Kyle models proposed in the...