For games of simultaneous action selection and network formation, game-theoretic behavior and experimental observations … of the Hawk-Dove game with endogenous network formation and show that the repetition leads to additional equilibria … their strategy. Subjects only reach efficient outcomes if they first adapt their action and then their network. If they …

convergence is 1/T, regardless of the size of the network. In contrast, arbitrary n-person zero-sum games with bilinear payoff … requires a condition on bilateral payoffs or, alternatively, that the network is acyclic. Our results hold also for the …

if the network is 2-connected: that is, if no player can prevent the flow of information to another. In contrast, the …

I look at the equilibrium effects of homophily in network formation games having positive externalities. I show that … very weak preferences for network effects (such as preference for being part of a clique) may result in very high levels of … homophily at equilibrium. I present an empirical procedure that allows an evaluation of the role of network effects on the …

In this paper we introduce a stochastic network formation model where agents choose both actions and links. Neighbors … in the network benefit from each other's action levels through local complementarities and there exists a global …

Three kinds of activities happen in a network: agents link or unlink; agents act; agents observe and learn. The … existing literature on network formation, on network games and on monitoring and learning in networks studies each of these in … are linked and (perhaps) from a public signal. We define a repeated network game and an equilibrium of this game. An …

In this paper we introduce a stochastic network formation model where agents choose both actions and links. Neighbors … in the network benefit from each other's action levels through local complementarities and there exists a global …

connected and undirected network. Players observe their immediate neighbors' behavior only, but communicate over time the … repeated game's history truthfully throughout the network. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of … produces a network result; namely, the level of cooperation in this setup depends on the network's diameter, and not on its …