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We consider a best-of-three Tullock contest between two ex-ante identical players. An effort-maximizing designer commits to a vector of player-specific biases (advantages or disadvantages). In our benchmark model the designer chooses victory-dependent biases (i.e., the biases depend on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012918987
This paper studies an economic contest with identical prizes. We consider the effects of division of the contest. When the contest designer divides the contest symmetrically, each participant competes in each assigned division. The main result is that division is sometimes profitable for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014073163
We examine the effectiveness of bonuses and fines in an "inspection game" where an employer can learn the effort of a worker through costly inspection. Standard game theoretic analysis predicts that fines discourage shirking, whereas bonuses encourage shirking. In contrast, ownpayoff effects...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008933797
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comparison group in China, we examine how both psychological and financial incentives, together with attitudes toward risk, may … rank-based financial incentives. Our results show that performance-ranking information had a significant motivational … effect on average performance for students, but not for that of workers. Adding financial incentives based on rank provided …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011407820
Tournaments are often used to improve performance in innovation contexts. Tournaments provide monetary incentives but …,700 participants), we vary the salience of team identity, social-image concerns, and whether teams face monetary incentives. Increased … monetary incentives improve all teams’ outcomes without crowding out teams’ willingness to explore or perform similar tasks …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012597694
We experimentally investigate a repeated "inspection game" where, in the stage game, an employee can either work or shirk and an employer simultaneously chooses to inspect or not inspect. Combined payoffs are maximized when the employee works and the employer does not inspect. However, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578200
We experimentally investigate a repeated "inspection game" where, in the stage game, an employee can either work or shirk and an employer simultaneously chooses to inspect or not inspect. The unique equilibrium of the stage game is in mixed strategies with positive probabilities of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010340303
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